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Abstract—Each agent in a network makes a local observation
that is linearly related to a set of public and private parameters.
The agents send their observations to a fusion center to allow it to
estimate the public parameters. To prevent leakage of the private
parameters, each agent first sanitizes its local observation using
a local privacy mechanism before transmitting it to the fusion
center. We investigate the utility-privacy tradeoff in terms of the
Cramér-Rao lower bounds for estimating the public and private
parameters. We study the class of privacy mechanisms given by
linear compression and noise perturbation, and derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for achieving arbitrarily strong utility-
privacy tradeoff in a multi-agent system for both the cases where
prior information is available and unavailable, respectively. We
also provide a method to find the maximum estimation privacy
achievable without compromising the utility and propose an
alternating algorithm to optimize the utility-privacy tradeoff in
the case where arbitrarily strong utility-privacy tradeoff is not
achievable.
Index Terms—Inference privacy, Cramér-Rao lower bound,
linear estimation, multi-agent network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of multifarious sensing and monitor-
ing applications installed in mobile phones, offices and public
facilities has led to the proliferation of various services based
on network data analytics [1]–[4]. Due to the limited data
that a single sensor or agent can observe because of its geo-
graphical placement or location, agent type and computation
capabilities, multi-agent networks [5]–[13] are often deployed
to overcome the insufficiency of data retrieved from a single
agent. Agent fusion or sense-making is then used to combine
the sensory data derived from disparate sources to reduce the
inference uncertainty. However, aggregation of data poses a
higher risk of privacy leakage. For example, social network
users in a community may share their personal opinions or
experiences about different products over time. While the ag-
gregated data can be useful feedback for a company to improve
its own product, with a database recording the preferences
of each user for multiple products over a period of time,
one can infer personal traits and other sensitive attributes like
the gender and income level of a user. Furthermore, studies
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[14] have shown that information from a user’s friends on a
social network can accurately reveal the user’s marital status,
location, sexual orientation or political affiliation. Therefore, it
is imperative that data from each source is sanitized to reduce
privacy leakage before revealing it to the public.
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent network where
each source, node or agent (for convenience, we call this
an agent throughout the paper) makes a noisy observation,
which is linearly related to a set of system parameters. A
set of public and private parameters are defined to be linear
maps of the system parameters. We assume the agents send
their observations to a fusion center to allow it to infer the
public parameter with high fidelity [15]–[18]. The agents
however want to keep the private parameters secret. To achieve
this, each agent sanitizes its observation before sending to
the fusion center. In this paper, we consider two sanitization
methods: linear compression and noise perturbation. Since a
trusted third-party who can help perturb the agent observations
in a centralized manner does not exist or is impractical in
many applications, a decentralized1 sanitization scheme is
considered where each agent performs its local sanitization
independently.
A. Related Work
We can classify privacy into two types: data privacy and
inference privacy [19]–[22]. Data privacy often refers to pro-
tecting access to the raw data while inference privacy refers to
the prevention of illegitimately inferring sensitive information
[19], [20]. Homomorphic encryption is a classical method for
data privacy [23]. However, such an approach is unable to hide
the sensitive information contained in the encrypted data. Dif-
ferential privacy [24], [25] ensures the indistinguishability of
the query records in a database. However, differential privacy
only deals with a source alphabet with finite support, and thus
does not apply to the privacy in estimation theory. The other
privacy metrics that have been extensively used in inference
privacy include mutual information (entropy) privacy, average
information leakage and maximum information leakage [26].
The privacy we consider in this paper belongs to the category
of inference privacy.
Privacy-preserving estimation and detection from a sin-
gle data source or agent has been well-studied by using
information-theoretic approaches. The paper [27] presented an
information-theoretic framework that ensures the utility of the
data source while providing necessary privacy guarantees in
1The term “decentralized” refers to the data sanitization process at each
agent, which is independent of the other agents.
2a database associated with a statistical model. The following
works are based on a general privacy statistical framework:
Two random variables (X,Y ) are assumed to be associated
with a given joint distribution, and a user observes Y and
wants to disclose to another user as much information about Y
as possible while limiting the amount of information revealed
about X [28]. To achieve that, the data is transformed before
being disclosed, according to a probabilistic privacy mapping.
The paper [19] introduced two privacy metrics, namely average
information leakage and maximum information leakage, and
showed that optimal privacy-accuracy tradeoff can be cast as
modified rate-distortion problems. In [29], [30], the authors
formulated the privacy-utility tradeoff in terms of the smallest
normalized minimum mean-squared error. Furthermore, the
references [31], [32] characterized the fundamental perfor-
mance limits of privacy-assuring mechanisms from an estima-
tion theoretic perspective, and developed data-driven privacy
mechanisms that provide estimation-theoretic guarantees [33].
The papers [34], [35] introduced a log-loss metric to measure
privacy and utility and linked the privacy funnel method to the
information bottleneck method [36]. In [37]–[40], the authors
investigated the utility-privacy tradeoff quantified by mutual
information in smart metering using a rate-distortion approach.
All the above-mentioned works only deal with single entry
data and do not generalize immediately to the multi-agent set-
ting where decentralized sanitization mechanism is required.
One of the underlying presumptions of these works is that a
single user owns the data, while this paper considers the case
where data is distributed among multiple users.
Several papers have addressed the issue of privacy pro-
tection under the hypothesis testing framework in a multi-
agent system from different perspectives. The papers [41],
[42] investigated the privacy leakage problem in an eaves-
dropped distributed hypothesis test network from the Bayesian
detection perspective. Under a similar decentralized detection
framework, the papers [20], [43] proposed a nonparametric
learning approach to design local privacy mappings to distort
each agent’s observation, thus preventing the fusion center
from using its received information to accurately infer the
private hypothesis. The paper [44] considered ways to achieve
robust information privacy for a set of private hypotheses while
[45] proposed a multi-layer agent network where non-linear
fusion is applied. In contrast to these papers, which focus on
the protection of a private hypothesis in a hypothesis testing
framework, we consider in this paper the privacy protection of
a set of parameters in a parameter estimation framework. An
example is in the deployment of various body sensors (agents)
for evaluating a user’s health condition [46]. With the raw
observations sent from the sensors, a service provider can not
only analyze the user’s health condition but can also infer
some sensitive information about the user such as her location
and personal preferences. Therefore, preserving the privacy of
certain sensitive parameters associated with the sensor data is
an important requirement.
The references [30], [37] proposed to add random noise to
perturb raw measurements, while [47]–[54] investigated the
use of compressive linear mappings that transform the raw
measurements to a lower dimensional space. Preserving the
privacy of individual entries of a database with constrained
additive noise was considered in [55] where a measure of
privacy using the Fisher information matrix [56] was devel-
oped. These works did not explore the connection between
adding random noise and compressive linear transformations
as privacy mechanisms. In this paper, one of our contributions
is to clarify the relationship between these two mechanisms.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the case where agents in a
network send sanitized observations to a fusion center to allow
it to infer a set of public parameters, while preventing it from
estimating a set of private parameters better than a predefined
accuracy. Our main contributions are the following:
1) We make explicit the relationship between additive ran-
dom noise and linear compression as privacy mechanisms
under the Cramér-Rao lower bound (CRLB) privacy
framework. We show that the CRLBs for estimating the
private parameters under the linear compression mecha-
nism form the boundary of the set of CRLBs under noise
perturbation.
2) We introduce the notion of arbitrarily strong utility-
privacy tradeoff (ASUP), and derived necessary and
sufficient conditions under which this is achievable. In
addition, we propose a method to find the maximum
privacy that can be attained while maintaining perfect
utility under a constraint on the noise perturbation power.
3) In the case where ASUP is not achievable, we propose an
alternating optimization algorithm to find a sanitization to
achieve an optimal utility-privacy tradeoff.
A preliminary version of this work was presented in [57]
in which the noise perturbation method was used to protect
the private parameters, while allowing the inference of the
public parameters. The present paper delves into the analysis
of the privacy and utility tradeoff in multi-agent systems with
decentralized sanitization schemes and clarifies the relation-
ship between noise perturbation and linear compression. New
theoretical insights and methods are also presented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our problem formulation and assumptions. In
Section III, we investigate the relationship between additive
random noise and linear compression under our CRLB privacy
framework. In Section IV, we present necessary and sufficient
conditions for ASUP. In Section V, we consider the case where
ASUP is not achievable and investigate maximum privacy
under perfect utility with power constraint. An alternating op-
timization algorithm to optimize privacy under perfect utility
is presented in Section VI. We present numerical simulation
results in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
Notations: We use R to denote the set of real numbers,
and Sn, Sn+ to denote the set of n × n positive semi-definite
matrices and positive definite matrices, respectively. We use ⊺
to represent matrix transpose. The notation 0N is the N ×N
zero matrix, and IN is an N × N identity matrix. We write
A  B if A − B is positive semi-definite, while A ≻ 0
means A is positive definite. We use diag(·) to denote the
block diagonal operation and Tr (·) the trace operation. We use
3[P]P,Q to denote the sub-matrix of the matrix P consisting of
the entries P(i, j) for all (i, j) ∈ P × Q and use [P]:,Q and
[P]Q,: to denote the sub-matrix of the matrix P consisting of,
respectively, the columns and rows, indexed by Q. The rank
of the matrix A is rank(A) and Null (A) denotes its null
space. The Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2 is denoted as N (µ, σ2), and the uniform distribution on
the interval [a, b] is denoted as Unif (a, b).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present our system model and assump-
tions. Consider a multi-agent network consisting of the agents
i = 1, . . . , S and a fusion center. Each agent i makes a noisy
observation yi ∈ RNi about a system parameter x ∈ RL. The
observation model for agent i is given by
yi = Hix+ ni,
where Hi ∈ RNi×L is the observation model matrix, and
ni ∼ N (0Ni , Ri) is the measurement noise. Here, Ni may
be smaller than L, hence each agent i may not be able to
infer the system parameter x based on its own observation
yi. Furthermore, even if an agent i is able to estimate x
from its local observation yi, the fusion center with access
to all agents’ observations achieves a higher accuracy than
each individual agent.
In this paper, we consider the case where the fusion center
aims to estimate u = Ux ∈ RU , where U ∈ RU×L and
U > 0, based on information it receives from all agents in the
network. However, the agents also want to prevent the fusion
center from inferring a set of private parameters gi = Gix ∈
RGi , where Gi ∈ RGi×L, i = 1, . . . , S. We assume that at
least oneGi, i = 1, . . . , S, is non-zero. Otherwise our problem
formulation reduces to the case without privacy consideration.
Stacking up all agents’ measurements, we have
y = Hx+ n, (1)
where y = [y⊺1 , . . . ,y
⊺
S ]
⊺ ∈ RN , H = [H⊺1 , . . . ,H⊺S]⊺ ∈
RN×L, n = [n⊺1 , . . . ,n
⊺
S ]
⊺ ∈ RN , and N = ∑Si=1Ni.
Let Si = {
∑i−1
k=1Nk + 1, . . . ,
∑i
k=1Nk} be the index set
corresponding to agent i. Note that the measurement noise
ni and nj for any two different agents i and j are not
necessarily independent of each other. We assume that n ∼
N (0N ,R), where the block diagonal part of R is equal to
diag (R1, . . . ,RS) and the off-diagonal entries are the noise
correlations between agents.
Example 1. Consider an audio system consisting of S mi-
crophone arrays placed at different spatial locations. Let [x]k
represent the narrow band signal of the k-th person’s speech
in a group, and yi = Hix+ni be the mixed signals received
by the i-th microphone array, where ni is a complex Gaussian
noise, and Hi is a mixing matrix, where [Hi]j,k = αie
iθijk
with i =
√−1, αi being the gain and θijk being the phase
shift of the received signal of the k-th person’s speech at
the j-th sensor of the i-th microphone array. The microphone
arrays send the received signal to a cloud service to decode
the speech of a subgroup of persons in the index set P .
Meanwhile, we wish to protect the speech signals of people in
another distinct group indexed by Q from the cloud service.
Accordingly, U is diagonal matrix with 1’s on the diagonal at
the row indices in the index set P and zero everywhere else,
and for each i = 1, . . . , S, Gi is a diagonal matrix with 1’s
on the diagonal at the row indices in the index set Q and zero
everywhere else.
We assume all system parameters and model (including H,
R, U, G, etc.) are known to the fusion center. To protect the
private parameters {gi : i = 1, . . . , S} from being inferred
by the fusion center based on the collective measurements,
each agent sanitizes its local observation before transmitting
to the fusion center. Let T (y) = [T1(y1)⊺, . . . , TS(yS)⊺]⊺
denote the sanitized information received at the fusion center,
where T belongs to a predefined class of sanitization mech-
anisms. We measure the utility and privacy by the CRLBs
for estimating the public parameter u and private parameters
{gi : i = 1, . . . , S}, respectively. Recall that the CRLB [58],
[59] is a lower bound on the variance of an unbiased estimator.
Suppose py|x is a probability density function of a random
variable y conditioned on x, and x ∼ px (prior information).
For any unbiased estimator xˆ(y) of x based on y, we
have E−NoV alue− [(xˆ(y) − x) (xˆ(y) − x)⊺]  (Jx + J0)−1,
where
Jx = −E−NoV alue−
[
∂2 log(py|x(y|x))
∂x2
]
, J0 = −E−NoV alue−
[
∂2 log(p(x))
∂x2
]
with (Jx + J0)
−1 known as the CRLB for estimating x. If x is
a deterministic parameter (J0 = 0), we have cov(xˆ(y))  J−1x
for any unbiased estimator xˆ(y). In other words, no unbiased
estimator can outperform the CRLB in terms of error variance.
Denoting the CRLB of the system variable x before saniti-
zation as Px and after sanitization as P˜x, the CRLBs for the
public parameter u before and after sanitization at the agents
are
Pu = UPxU
⊺,
P˜u = UP˜xU
⊺,
respectively. Similarly, the CRLBs for the private parameter
gi before and after sanitization at the agents are
Pgi = GiPxG
⊺
i ,
P˜gi = GiP˜xG
⊺
i ,
respectively.
The quantity Tr (Pu) gives a lower bound for the sum
error variance for estimating every component of u. For each
sanitization function T , we define the system utility function
for the public parameter u as
u(T ) = 1−
Tr
(
P˜u
)
Tr (Pu)
≤ 0, (2)
which is the negative of the percentage increase in sum
error variance lower bound for estimating u due to privacy
sanitization. We define the system privacy function for the
private parameter gi, i = 1, . . . , S, as
pi(T ) =
Tr
(
P˜gi
)
Tr (Pgi)
− 1, (3)
4which is the percentage increase in sum error variance lower
bound for estimating gi due to privacy sanitization. Since
T can be viewed as part of the estimation procedure, we
have P˜x ≻ Px. Therefore, u(T ) ≤ 0 and pi(T ) ≥ 0 for
all T . The utility and privacy functions as defined are thus
intuitive: perturbation on the measurement decreases the utility
and increases the privacy. Our goal is to
max
T
u(T ),
s.t. pi(T ) ≥ ǫi, i = 1, . . . , S,
(P0)
where ǫi ≥ 0 is called the privacy threshold for agent i. We
summarize the notations introduced so far in Table I for the
reader’s convenience.
III. DECENTRALIZED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
TRANSFORMATION
In this section, we study two sanitization schemes T that are
widely used in the privacy literature: 1) linear compression that
reduces the dimension of the measurements [49], and 2) noise
perturbation that adds random noise to the measurements [39].
We derive the relationship between these two schemes under
CRLB-based privacy criteria like that in (3). We show that the
noise perturbation scheme is equivalent to linear compression
in an asymptotic sense.
To prevent the fusion center or potential adversarial agents
from inferring the set of private parameters g1, . . . ,gS through
the measurement y, we consider an affine transformation Ti :
RNi 7→ RMi where Mi ≤ Ni to sanitize the measurement of
agent i to obtain:
Ti(yi) = Ciyi + ξi = H˜ixi + n˜i + ξi,
where Ci ∈ RMi×Ni is called the compression matrix and
ξi ∈ RMi is a perturbation noise with ξi ∼ N (0Ni , Θi). We
also have H˜i = CiHi ∈ RMi×L, n˜i = Cini ∈ RMi and
n˜i ∼ N
(
0Ni , R˜i
)
with R˜i = CiRiC
⊺
i . By collecting all
the perturbed measurements, the measurement model at the
fusion center can be summarized as follows:
T (y) = Cy + ξ = H˜x+ n˜+ ξ,
where T (y) = [T1(y1)⊺, . . . , TS(yS)⊺]⊺ ∈ RM , H˜ = CH,
M =
∑S
i=1Mi, n˜ ∼ N (0N , CRC⊺), ξ⊺ = [ξ⊺1 , . . . , ξ⊺S ] ∈
RM , ξ ∼ N (0N , Θ), C = diag(C1, . . . ,CS),Θ =
diag(Θ1, . . . ,ΘS).
Note that the global sanitization function T is composed
of independent local sanitization functions T1, . . . , TS , the i-
th of which applies a local linear compression matrix Ci
and additive noise ξi with covariance Θi to the i-th agent’s
measurement yi. Both the global compression matrix C and
additive noise covariance matrix Θ have block diagonal form.
There is no message exchange between agents during the
sanitization process as this is prone to privacy attacks.
From (2) and (3), we can express the utility and privacy
function with respect to (w.r.t.) C and Θ as
u(C,Θ) = 1−
Tr
(
UP˜x(C,Θ)U
⊺
)
Tr (UPxU⊺)
, (4)
pi(C,Θ) =
Tr
(
GiP˜x(C,Θ)G
⊺
i
)
Tr (GiPxG
⊺
i )
− 1, (5)
where
P˜x(C,Θ) = J˜x(C,Θ)
−1
=
(
J0 +H
⊺C⊺ (CRC⊺ +Θ)
−1
CH
)−1
.
(6)
Here, J0 is the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) of any
prior information. We let J0 = 0L if no prior information
is available. There is no loss in generality if we restrict
compression matrices Cis to be square matrices, i.e., we
consider (C,Θ) to be chosen from the following sanitization
parameter set
C =
{
(C,Θ)
∣∣∣ C = diag(C1, . . . ,CS) ∈ RN×N ,
Θ = diag(Θ1, . . . ,ΘS),
Ci ∈ RNi×Ni ,Θi ∈ SNi , i = 1, . . . , S
}
.
(7)
This is because the perturbed CRLB remains unaltered by
padding a non-square C and Θ with zeroes: J˜x(C,Θ) =
J˜x(C,Θ), where C =
[
C
0
]
, Θ =
[
Θ 0′
0
]
, and 0 and 0′ are
(N −M)×N and M × (N −M) zero matrices respectively.
In the following, we prove some properties of J˜x(C,Θ)
with the domain C. We consider the metric spaces RN×N×SN
and SL endowed with the Frobenius norm so that C is a subset
of RN×N × SN and P˜x(·, ·) is a mapping from RN×N × SN
to SL. Notions of metric properties like continuity are defined
w.r.t. these metric spaces.
Lemma 1. Let (C,Θ) ∈ C, where C ∈ RN×N and Θ ∈
SN×N .
(i) J˜x(C,Θ) is a continuous function on C.
(ii) Suppose A is either a unitary matrix or an invertible
block diagonal matrix. Then, we have J˜x(AC,Θ) =
J˜x(C,A
⊺ΘA).
Proof: The first claim follows immediately from (6). For
the second claim, suppose first that A is unitary. We then have
J˜x(AC,Θ) = J0 +H
⊺C⊺A⊺ (ACRC⊺A⊺ +Θ)
−1
ACH
= J0 +H
⊺C⊺ (CRC⊺ +A⊺ΘA)
−1
CH
= J˜x(C,A
⊺ΘA).
The proof for the case where A is an invertible block diagonal
matrix is similar and the proof is complete.
Proposition 1. (i) Let A =
{
J˜x(IN ,Θ) : (IN ,Θ) ∈ C
}
and B =
{
J˜x(C,Θ) : (C,Θ) ∈ C
}
. Then, B\A is the
boundary of A.
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SUMMARY OF COMMONLY-USED SYMBOLS
Notation Definition
yi
The agent i’s measurements: yi = Hix+ ni ∈ RNi , where x ∈ RL and
ni ∼ N
(
0Ni , Ri
)
.
y, T (y) The raw measurements and sanitized measurements from all agents 1, . . . , S.
R,H
The agents’ measurements noise covariance matrix R ∈ SN and observation matrix
H ∈ RN×L.
Si The index set corresponding to agent i, i.e., [R]Si,Si = Ri and [H]Si,: = Hi.
u,gi,U,Gi The public parameter u = Ux ∈ RU and the i-th private parameter gi =Gix ∈ RGi .
Px The CRLB for estimating x from the raw measurements y.
P˜x, P˜u, P˜gi The CRLB for estimating x, u and gi, respectively, from sanitized data T (y).
u(T ), pi(T )
The utility function for u and privacy function for gi, respectively, using sanitization function
T .
ǫi The privacy threshold assigned to agent i.
Φ
If J0 = 0L, Φ = R−1 −R−1HPxH⊺R−1. Otherwise, Φ = (HP0H⊺ +R)
−1. Cf.
(10) and (14).
Ψ If J0 = 0L, Ψ = P0H⊺Φ. Otherwise, Ψ = PxH⊺R−1. Cf. (11) and (15).
(ii) For any (C,Θ) ∈ C, there exists (C′,Λb) ∈ C, where Λb
is a diagonal matrix with [Λb]i,i ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ≥ 1,
such that
P˜x(C
′,Λb) = P˜x(C,Θ).
Proof:
(i) Since A ⊂ B, it suffices to show that for any B ∈ B,
there exists a sequence in A that converges to B. From
Lemma 1(ii), we have J˜x(C,Θ) = J˜x(IN ,C⊺ΘC) with
J˜x(IN ,C
⊺ΘC) ∈ A if C is invertible. On the other
hand, if C is a singular matrix, we let the eigende-
composition of C = QΛQ−1, where Q is the square
matrix whose columns are the eigenvector, and Λ is
the diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the
corresponding eigenvalues. Denote Λ = diag(Λ′,0A)
with Λ′ containing all the non-zero eigenvalues and an
appropriate A. From Lemma 1(ii), we have
J˜x(C,Θ) = J˜x(QΛQ
−1,Θ) = J˜x(ΛQ
−1,Θ′), (8)
where Θ′ = Q⊺ΘQ. For any λ > 0, let Λλ =
diag(Λ′, λIA), which is an invertible diagonal matrix.
From Lemma 1(ii), we have
J˜x(ΛλQ
−1,Θ′) = J˜x(IN , (ΛλQ
−1)⊺Θ′ΛλQ
−1) ∈ A,
whose left-hand side converges to the right-hand side of
(8) as λ→ 0 since J˜x is continuous by Lemma 1(i). The
proof is now complete.
(ii) Let the eigendecomposition of Θ = QΛQ⊺. The di-
agonal matrix Λ can be written as Λ1/2+ ΛbΛ
1/2
+ , where
Λ+ and Λb are diagonal matrices with [Λ+]i,i = [Λ]i,i,
[Λb]i,i = 1 when [Λ]i,i > 0, and [Λ+]i,i = 1, [Λb]i,i = 0
when [Λ]i,i = 0. Two applications of Lemma 1(ii) gives
us J˜x(C,Θ) = J˜x(C′,Λb), where C′ = Λ
−1/2
+ Q
⊺C
is a block diagonal matrix since Q, Λ+ and C are all
block diagonal matrices. Thus (C′,Λb) ∈ C and the claim
follows.
Proposition 1(ii) shows that the power of the additive noise
can be normalized by the compression matrix when sanitizing
the data. On the other hand, Proposition 1(i) shows that adding
only noise can approximate linear compression arbitrarily well
in terms of the estimation error covariance, but this requires
arbitrarily large noise power. Therefore, perturbation noise by
itself cannot replace linear compression in a practical system.
Without loss of generality, we set the compression matrixC =
IN in the sequel as we can always normalize the noise by
a compression matrix to obtain the same utility and privacy
tradeoff. We now rewrite the optimization problem (P0) as
max
(IN ,Θ)∈C
u(IN ,Θ),
s.t. pi(IN ,Θ) ≥ ǫi, i = 1, . . . , S.
(P1)
Note that for (P1) to be feasible when J0 6= 0L, the privacy
threshold ǫi should satisfy ǫi ≤ ǫimax, where
ǫi
max = Tr
(
GiJ
−1
0 G
⊺
i
)
/Tr (GiPxG
⊺
i )− 1,
for Gi 6= 0, and ǫimax = 0 if Gi = 0. This is because the
prior information (as quantified by its FIM J0) already leaks
privacy and any sanitization cannot achieve a higher level of
privacy than this. When J0 = 0L, we have ǫimax = ∞ if
Gi 6= 0 and 0 otherwise.
The following useful expressions can be derived by using
the binomial inverse theorem and Woodbury matrix identity
(see Appendix A for details).
1) No prior information, i.e., J0 = 0L, we have
P˜x(IN ,Θ) = Px +Ψ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺, (9)
where
Φ = R−1 −R−1HPxH⊺R−1 (10)
is a degenerate matrix and
Ψ = PxH
⊺R−1. (11)
2) With prior information, i.e., J0 ≻ 0L, we have
P˜x (IN ,Θ) = P0 −P0H⊺
(
Φ−1 +Θ
)−1
HP0 (12)
= Px +Ψ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺, (13)
where P0 = J
−1
0 ,
Φ = (HP0H
⊺ +R)
−1
, (14)
6and
Ψ = P0H
⊺Φ. (15)
By considering the observation model y = Hx + n, Ψ in
(9) is the same as the minimum mean square error estimation
matrix. By regarding P0 as the predicted estimate covariance,
Ψ and Φ−1 in (13) are equivalent to the Kalman gain and
innovation covariance, respectively. The equations (9) and (13)
under both the cases where prior information is available
and unavailable have meaningful interpretations: the first term
of both equations is the CRLB without perturbation while
the second term is the increased CRLB caused by noise
perturbation.
IV. ARBITRARILY STRONG PRIVACY WITH PERFECT
UTILITY
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for achieving perfect utility and arbitrarily strong privacy when
prior information is available and unavailable, respectively.
Definition 1. We say that arbitrarily strong utility-privacy
tradeoff (ASUP) is achievable if for any non-negative ǫi <
ǫmaxi , i = 1, . . . , S, there exists (C,Θ) ∈ C such that
u(C,Θ) = 0 and pi(C,Θ) ≥ ǫi for all i = 1, . . . , S.
While achieving perfect utility (by taking T to be (IN ,0N )
and arbitrarily strong privacy (by taking T to be (0N ,0N )) are
easy, achieving both at the same time is difficult or infeasible.
Therefore, it is of interest to know when ASUP is achievable.
In the following, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for ASUP under both the cases where prior information is
available and unavailable. Moreover, we provide a method to
construct the noise covariance to achieve ASUP inside the
proofs (if ASUP is feasible). We start with the following two
preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 2. For matricesA ∈ RM×N ,B ∈ SN and a sequence
of pairwise commuting matrices (Sn)n≥1 where each Sn ⊂
SN+ , we have
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn +B)
−1
A⊺
)
= 0,
if and only if
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
AS−1n A
⊺
)
= 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 3. For matrices A ∈ RM1×N and B ∈ RM2×N
such that M1,M2 ≤ N , there exists S ∈ SN such that
Tr (ASA⊺) = 0 and
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
B
(
nS+
1
n
IN
)−1
B⊺
)
= 0,
if and only if AB⊺ = 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
A. ASUP without prior information
In this subsection, we consider the case J0 = 0L.
Theorem 1. Suppose J0 = 0L. Recall Φ and Ψ as defined
in (10) and (11), respectively. For i ∈ {1, . . . , S}, let Ξi =[
U[Ψ]
:,Si
[Φ]Si,Si
]
. There existsΘ ∈ SN such that ASUP is achievable
if and only if for each Gj 6= 0 where j ∈ {1, . . . , S}, there
exists at least an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , S} such that
(i) Ni > rank(Ξi), and
(ii) there does not exist any matrix P such that PΞi =
Gj [Ψ]:,Si .
Proof: Note that condition (i) is equivalent to
Null
(
[Φ]Si,Si
)
∩ Null
(
U [Ψ]:,Si
)
6= {0}, (16)
and condition (ii) is equivalent to(
Null
(
[Φ]Si,Si
)
∩ Null
(
U [Ψ]:,Si
))
* Null
(
Gj [Ψ]:,Si
)
.
(17)
We first show the necessity of conditions (i) and (ii). From
(2) and (9), perfect utility u(IN ,Θ) = 0 is obtained only if
Tr
(
UΨ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺U⊺
)
= 0.
Since the left-hand side (LHS) of the above equation is
a continuous function w.r.t. Θ, the above equation can be
expressed as
lim
n→∞
Tr
UΨ((Θ+ 1
n
IN
)−1
+Φ
)−1
Ψ⊺U⊺
 = 0.
From Lemma 2, this is equivalent to
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
UΨ
(
Θ+
1
n
IN
)
Ψ⊺U⊺
)
= 0,
or
Tr (UΨΘΨ⊺U⊺) = 0.
Therefore, u(IN ,Θ) = 0 only if UΨΘ = 0. Following
that, U [Ψ]:,Sk Θk = 0, for all k = 1, . . . , S since Θ =
diag (Θ1, . . . ,ΘS). From the rank-nullity theorem, this im-
plies that Θk = 0Nk for an agent k with rank
(
U [Ψ]:,Sk
)
=
Nk. Since Gj 6= 0, to achieve any level of privacy, there must
exist at least an agent i with rank
(
U [Ψ]:,Si
)
< Ni with
U [Ψ]:,Si having a non-trivial null space. Let Θ be such that
Θi 6= 0Ni and
U [Ψ]:,Si Θi = 0. (18)
Since pj(IN ,Θ) is a non-decreasing function w.r.t. Θ,
arbitrarily strong privacy for the private parameter gj is
achieved only if
lim
n→∞
pj(IN , nΘ) =∞. (19)
7From (3) and (9), the LHS of the above statement (19) is
equivalent to
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
GjΨ (IN + nΘΦ)
−1
nΘΨ⊺G⊺j
)
= lim
n→∞
Tr
GjΨ
((
nΘ+
1
n
IN
)−1
+Φ
)−1
Ψ⊺G
⊺
j

= lim
n→∞
N∑
k=1
αk(n, j)λk(n),
where T(n) =
((
nΘ+ 1nIN
)−1
+Φ
)−1
, λk(n) is the k-
th eigenvalue of T(n) with vk(n) being the corresponding
unit eigenvector, and αk(n, j) = ‖GjΨvk(n)‖22. There-
fore, (19) holds only if there exists an index kj such
that limn→∞ λkj (n) = ∞ with corresponding eigenvectors
vkj (n) /∈ Null (GjΨ). Since GjΨ has finite rank, by passing
to a subsequence if necessary, there exists a unit vector
wj /∈ Null (GjΨ) such that
lim
n→∞
w
⊺
j (T(n))
−1
wj = 0.
We then have
lim
n→∞
w
⊺
j
(
nΘ+
1
n
IN
)−1
wj = 0, and
w
⊺
jΦwj = 0.
(20)
Since Θi 6= 0Ni , (20) holds only if w′j = [wj ]Si /∈
Null
(
Gj [Ψ]:,Si
)
and w′j 6= 0, such that
lim
n→∞
w′j
⊺
(
nΘi +
1
n
INi
)−1
w′j = 0, and (21)
[Φ]Si,Si w
′
j = 0. (22)
From Lemma 3, both (18) and (21) hold only if w′j ∈
Null
(
U [Ψ]:,Si
)
. Therefore, conditions (i) and (ii) are nec-
essary for ASUP.
We next prove sufficiency by constructing a Θ that yields
ASUP. Let a unit vector v′ satisfy
(a) v′ ∈ Null
(
[Φ]Si,Si
)
, and
(b) v′ ∈ Null
(
U [Ψ]:,Si
)
, and
(c) v′ /∈ Null
(
Gj [Ψ]:,Si
)
.
The existence of v′ is guaranteed by condition i and ii. Set
all the eigenvalues of Θi to 0 except for one eigenvalue
λ′ > 0 associated with a unit eigenvector v′. Let Θ˜j =
diag(. . . ,0Ni−1 ,Θi, ,0Ni+1 . . .). By reversing the arguments
used in the necessity proof, it can be verified that for any
ǫj > 0, there exists a large enough λ′ such that u(IN , Θ˜j) = 0
and pj(IN , Θ˜j) ≥ ǫj . Let Θ be the sum of Θ˜j over j and
such Θ leads to ASUP. The proof is now complete.
As an illustration, consider the special case H ∈ RL×L,
where Ψ turns out to be H−1 and Φ becomes 0N . Then from
(9), the perturbed CRLB for estimating x can be written as
P˜x(IN ,Θ) = Px +H
−1Θ (H⊺)
−1
= Px +
S∑
i=1
[
H−1
]
:,Si
Θi
[
(H⊺)−1
]⊺
:,Si
,
Algorithm 1 ASUP sanitization algorithm (J0 = 0L).
Input: For each agent i, Ψ in (11), pi(IN ,Θ) in (5), and Ξi
as defined in Theorem 1. Conditions of Theorem 1 are
satisfied.
1: for each agent i = 1, . . . , S do
2: Choose an orthonormal basis Wi of Null (Ξi).
3: Choose a row vector vi from Wi such that vi /∈
Null
(
Gi [Ψ]:,Si
)
.
4: Choose a matrix Xi such that Vi = [v
⊺
i ,Xi] is unitary.
Set Θi = Vi diag(λi,0Ni−1)V
⊺
i with λi > 0 and
Θ˜i = diag(. . . ,0Ni−1 ,Θi,0Ni+1 , . . .). Choose λi to
be large enough such that pi(IN , Θ˜i) ≥ ǫi.
5: Agent i generates a noise ξi ∼ N (0, Θi) and adds this
to its measurement yi.
6: end for
which is linear in the perturbation noise covarianceΘi of each
agent i. Recall that u = Ux and gi = Gix. It can be seen
that if there is one row in U
[
H−1
]
:,Si
not in the row space
of Gi
[
H−1
]
:,Si
, agent i can use arbitrarily large noise power
in the corresponding row of Θi so that the estimation error of
gi becomes arbitrarily large while the estimation error of u
remains unchanged. Theorem 1 generalizes this result to any
H. Based on Theorem 1, we can implement a decentralized
sanitization scheme as illustrated in Algorithm 1 if we have
Ni > rank(Ξi) and Null (Ξi) * Null
(
Gi [Ψ]:,Si
)
for each
agent i = 1, . . . , S.
B. ASUP with prior information
In this subsection, we consider the case J0 ≻ 0L.
Theorem 2. Suppose J0 ≻ 0L. ASUP is achievable if and
only if
U [Ψ]:,Si HiP0G
⊺ = 0, (23)
for every agent i = 1, . . . , S, where G = [G⊺1 , . . . ,G
⊺
S ]
⊺ ∈
RG×L.
Proof: From (13), perfect utility u(IN ,Θ) = 0 requires
Tr
(
UΨ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺U⊺
)
= 0.
Applying Lemma 2 and the same argument in the proof of
Theorem 1, the above statement holds if and only if
Tr (UΨΘΨ⊺U⊺) = 0. (24)
Arbitrarily strong privacy requires the existence ofΘ such that
lim
n→∞
pi(IN , nΘ) = ǫ
max
i , ∀ i = 1, . . . , S.
From (12), the above equation can be written as
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
GP0H
⊺
(
Φ−1 + nΘ
)−1
HP0G
⊺
)
= 0.
Since the LHS of the above statement is a continuous function
w.r.t. Θ, it is equivalent to
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
GP0H
⊺
(
Φ−1 + nΘ+
1
n
IN
)−1
HP0G
⊺
)
= 0.
8Algorithm 2 ASUP sanitization algorithm (J0 ≻ 0L).
Input: For each agent i, Ψ in (15) and Ξi = GJ
−1
0 H
⊺
i
with G defined in Theorem 2. Condition in Theorem 2
is satisfied.
1: for each agent i = 1, . . . , S do
2: Choose an orthonormal basisWi ∈ RWi×Ni of the row
space of Ξi.
3: Choose an orthonormal basis Yi of the row space of
U [Ψ]:,Si .
4: Choose a matrix Xi such that V
⊺
i = [W
⊺
i ,Y
⊺
i ,X
⊺
i ]
is unitary. Choose a diagonal matrix Λi  0Wi such
that Tr(ΞiW
⊺
iΛ
−1
i WiΞ
⊺
i ) ≤ ǫmaxi − ǫi. Let Θi =
V
⊺
i diag(Λi,0Ni−Wi)Vi.
5: Agent i generates a noise ξi ∼ N (0, Θi) and adds this
to its measurement yi.
6: end for
From Lemma 2, we have equivalently,
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
GP0H
⊺
(
nΘ+
1
n
IN
)−1
HP0G
⊺
)
= 0. (25)
Rewriting the perfect utility condition (24) and the arbitrarily
strong privacy condition (25) in terms of Θi, i = 1, . . . , S,
yields
S∑
i=1
Tr
(
U [Ψ]:,Si Θi [Ψ]
⊺
:,Si
U⊺
)
= 0,
lim
n→∞
S∑
i=1
Tr
(
GP0H
⊺
i
(
nΘi +
1
n
INi
)−1
HiP0G
⊺
)
= 0.
The proof of necessity now follows by applying Lemma 3
to the above statements. To show sufficiency, we can follow
the method in Appendix C to construct Θ as illustrated in
Algorithm 2, which guarantees pi(IN ,Θ) ≥ ǫi, for any given
ǫi < ǫ
max
i , i = 1, . . . , S. The theorem is now proved.
Note that ΨHP0 is the reduced estimate covariance for x
w.r.t. the prior estimate covariance P0 after agents observe
y. We may consider [Ψ]:,Si HiP0 in condition (23) as the re-
duced estimate covariance for agent i to observe yi. Theorem 2
gives the condition for each agent i = 1, . . . , S, to be able to
decrease this reduced estimate covariance to its minimum for
the private parameter gi = Gix without affecting the reduced
estimate covariance for the public parameter u = Ux.
We note that the privacy function is bounded when J0 ≻ 0L
because J0 ≻ 0L provides prior information about every
agent’s private parameter. The achievable privacy is the cumu-
lative result of the noise perturbation applied by each agent.
Since the privacy contributed by each agent is bounded when
J0 ≻ 0L, the maximum privacy is only obtained when all the
agents offer their maximum privacy. This is different from the
case J0 = 0L, where the privacy each agent can contribute is
unbounded. Therefore, we can rely on one agent to provide
arbitrarily strong privacy in Theorem 1. This explains why
ASUP for J0 = 0L requires only one agent while ASUP
for J0 ≻ 0L requires every agent. In the case where only
a set of agents satisfy the condition given in Theorem 2
when J0 ≻ 0L, we still can apply the sanitization method
in Algorithm 2 to these nodes. However, as a consequence,
we will obtain perfect utility but not arbitrarily strong privacy.
In what follows we give an example in which condition (23)
in Theorem 2 holds.
Example 2. Suppose Hi = H0 ∈ R(N/S)×L, for all i =
1, . . . , S, and the measurement noise is white, i.e., R = σ2IN .
In this case, we can verify that for some Ψ0 ∈ RN×(N/S),
[Ψ]:,Si = Ψ0, for all i = 1, . . . , S. WhenUΨ0H0P0G
⊺ = 0,
condition (23) is satisfied. Note that Ψ0H0P0 is the reduced
estimate covariance of x after agent i observes yi. Following
that, UΨ0H0P0G
⊺ can be interpreted as the reduced esti-
mate cross-covariance between the public parameter u and the
private parameters g1, . . . ,gS , which need to be uncorrelated
to make ASUP feasible.
V. MAXIMUM PRIVACY UNDER PERFECT UTILITY
In this section, we formulate the problem of achieving
maximal privacy under perfect utility (i.e., u(C,Θ) = 0) as a
linear matrix inequality optimization. When discussing ASUP,
we allow the power of the perturbation noise to be arbitrarily
large so that the privacy function can exceed arbitrarily large
privacy thresholds. In most practical applications, there is a
power constraint on the perturbation noise that can be added
(if we normalize the noise as discussed immediately before
(P1), this translates into a constraint on the dynamic range of
the compression mechanism.).
We consider the following optimization:
max
(IN ,Θ)∈C
S∑
i=1
pi(IN ,Θ),
s. t. u(IN ,Θ) = 0,
Tr (Θi) ≤ δi, for i = 1, . . . , S,
(26)
where δi > 0 is the maximum total power available to agent
i. In the following, we show how to reformulate (26) as a
convex optimization problem with linear matrix inequality
(LMI) constraints.
Recall from Theorems 1 and 2 that u(IN ,Θ) = 0 under
both the cases J0 = 0L and J0 ≻ 0L is achievable if and
only if
Tr (UΨΘΨ⊺U⊺) = 0.
By introducing an auxiliary variable Z ∈ SL, (26) can be cast
as
max
(IN ,Θ)∈C,Z∈SL
S∑
i=1
GiZG
⊺
i ,
s.t. Z  P˜x(IN ,Θ),
Tr (UΨΘΨ⊺U⊺) = 0,
diag
(
(Tr (Θi))
S
i=1
) ≤ diag((δi)Si=1).
(27)
Note that the maximization will force Z to achieve its upper
bound.
In the case J0 = 0L, we need the following form of the
perturbed CRLB before transforming the first constraint of
(27) into a LMI. Let the column vectors of H be a basis of
9Null (H⊺) and let K = [K⊺1 ,K
⊺
2 ]
⊺
=
[
H,H
]−1
with K1 ∈
RL×N . We obtain from (6)
P˜x(IN ,Θ) =
(
H⊺ (R+Θ)
−1
H
)−1
=
([
(K⊺)−1 (R+Θ)−1K−1
]
L,L
)−1
=
([
(K(R+Θ)K⊺)−1
]
L,L
)−1
= K1Θ˜K
⊺
1 −K1Θ˜K⊺2
(
K2Θ˜K
⊺
2
)−1
K2Θ˜K
⊺
1 ,
where Θ˜ = R +Θ, L = {1, . . . , L} and the last equation is
a consequence of the block matrix inversion. Substituting the
above expression into the first constraint of (27) and using the
Schur complement, the constraint can be cast as the following
LMI:[
K1(Θ+R)K
⊺
1 K1(Θ+R)K
⊺
2
K2(Θ+R)K
⊺
1 K2(Θ+R)K
⊺
2
]
−
[
Z 0
0 0N−L
]
 0N .
Similarly, in the case J0 ≻ 0L, by substituting (12) into the
first constraint of (27), it can be linearized as[
P0 − Z P0H⊺
HP0 Φ
−1 +Θ
]
 0N+L.
The above formulations can then be solved by using standard
semi-definite programming techniques [60].
Together with the results in Theorems 1 and 2, one may
proceed to design the sanitization mechanism at each agent
as follows. One first checks if the necessary and sufficient
conditions for achieving ASUP are satisfied. If so and if
there is no power constraint, we can use the steps outlined
in Algorithms 1 and 2 to choose the sanitization mappings.
If there is a power constraint, we solve (27). On the other
hand, if ASUP is not achievable, we propose an alternating
optimization procedure to solve (P1) in the following section.
VI. ALTERNATING OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we propose an algorithm to solve (P1) for
both the cases where information is available and unavailable.
Because Θ is restricted to be a block diagonal matrix and
the utility and privacy functions are non-linear w.r.t. Θ, it is
difficult to directly solve the optimization problem (P1) using
standard optimization tools. We propose to optimize (P1) w.r.t.
Θ1, . . . ,ΘS , sequentially and in an alternating fashion, instead
of Θ. We show that optimizing (P1) over Θi is a convex
problem, which can be solved by semi-definite programming
[60].
To proceed, we need to do a trivial relaxation by assuming
Θ is invertible. Then both the perturbed CRLBs when J0 =
0L and J0 ≻ 0L in (9) and (13) can be written as
P˜x (IN ,Θ) = Px +Ψ
(
Θ−1 +Φ
)−1
Ψ⊺, (28)
where Ψ and Φ refer to their respective definitions when
prior information is available or unavailable. Therefore, the
algorithm to be proposed when J0 = 0L and J0 ≻ 0L can
be described as one. For sequential optimization, only Θi is
updated at the i-th sequence while the rest of the parameters
are fixed. By doing this, the utility and privacy tradeoff can
be cast as a standard semi-definite programming problem w.r.t.
Θi. Denote Θ = Θ−1 and for i = 1, . . . , S, let Θi = Θ
−1
i
and
Θ\i = diag(Θ1, . . . ,Θi−1,Θi+1, . . . ,ΘS).
We can permute the rows of Θ to obtain diag(Θi,Θ\i). In
the same way, we permute the rows of H and R to obtain[
H
⊺
i ,H
⊺
1 , . . . ,H
⊺
i−1,H
⊺
i+1, . . . ,H
⊺
S
]⊺
,
diag(Ri,R1, . . . ,Ri−1,Ri+1, . . . ,RS),
respectively. Substitute the above expressions for H and R,
respectively, in Φ and Ψ to obtain Φi and Ψi. Treating Θ\i
as a constant, the perturbed CRLB (28) can be written as a
function of Θi:
Px(Θi) = Px +Ψi
(
diag(Θi,Θ\i) +Φi
)−1
Ψi
⊺.
Note the above expression of the CRLB is equal to the
CRLB in (28) since the permutation process keeps the CRLB
unchanged.
Consequently, the utility and j-th privacy function for j =
1, . . . , S, w.r.t. Θi can be expressed as (see Appendix D for
details)
u(Θi) = −Tr
(
Γu
(
Θi +Ω
)−1)
/Tr (UPxU
⊺)−∆u,
(29)
pj(Θi) = Tr
(
Γpj
(
Θi +Ω
)−1)
/Tr
(
GjPxG
⊺
j
)
+∆pj ,
(30)
where Ω,∆pj ,∆u,Γu,Γp are constants independent of Θi
given by
Ni = {1, . . . , Ni}, N\i = {Ni + 1, . . . , N},
∆pj = Tr
(
Gj [Ψi]:,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
G
⊺
j
)
/Tr
(
GjPxG
⊺
j
)
,
∆u = Tr
(
U [Ψi]:,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
U⊺
)
/Tr (UPxU
⊺),
Γu = [Ψi]
⊺
:,Ni
U⊺U [Ψi]:,Ni
− [Ψi]⊺:,Ni U⊺U [Ψi]:,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni
− [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
U⊺U [Ψi]:,Ni
+ [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
U⊺U [Ψi]:,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni ,
Γpj = [Ψi]
⊺
:,Ni
G
⊺
jGj [Ψi]:,Ni
− [Ψi]⊺:,Ni G⊺jGj [Ψi]:,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni
− [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
G
⊺
jGj [Ψi]:,Ni
+ [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
G
⊺
jGj [Ψi]:,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni ,
Ω = [Φi]Ni,Ni − [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni ,
T =
(
Θ\i + [Φi]N\i,N\i
)−1
.
At the i-th sequence, we treat Θ\i as a constant and optimize
(P1) over Θi. This optimization problem can be formulated
as
max
Θi0Ni
u(Θi),
s.t. pj(Θi) ≥ ǫj, ∀ j = 1, . . . , S,
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which can be re-cast as a semidefinite programming problem
by introducing Z =
(
Θi +Ω
)−1
to obtain:
min
Z
Tr (ΓuZ),
s.t. Tr
(
ΓpjZ
) ≥ ǫ′j , ∀ j = 1, . . . , S,
0Ni  Z  Ω−1,
(P2)
where ǫ′j =
(
ǫj −∆pj
)× Tr (GjPxG⊺j ).
We propose to optimize (P1) over Θ1, . . . ,ΘS sequentially
over multiple iterations. The algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Alternating optimization
Initialize: Θ
0
i = 0Ni, i = 1, . . . , S at iteration 0.
Output: Θ
k
i , i = 1, . . . , S at iteration k.
1: while k ≤ Max. number of iterations do
2: for i = 1 to S do
3: Compute ǫ′j,Γu and Γpj for all j = 1, . . . , S.
4: Solve (P2) to obtain Θ
k
i .
5: Use Θ
k
i to update Θ
k
\i+1, . . . ,Θ
k
\S .
6: end for
7: end while
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the section, we investigate the impact of different pa-
rameters on the maximum privacy attainable under perfect
utility discussed in Section IV and verify the performance
of Algorithm 3 proposed in Section VI. The settings used
for the simulations in this section are given as follows unless
otherwise stated:
• The total number of agents’ observations, N = 72.
• The number of agent i’s observations, Ni = N/S for
i = 1, . . . , S.
• The dimension of the hidden parameter x, L = 12.
• The measurement noise covarianceR = AA⊺, where the
entries of A ∈ R72×72 are independent samples drawn
from Unif (−0.5, 0.5).
• The entries of the observation model matrix H ∈ R72×12
are independent samples drawn from Unif (−0.5, 0.5).
• The prior information P0 = AA⊺, where the entries
of A ∈ R12×12 are independent samples drawn from
Unif (−10, 10).
• The entries of the projection matrix of the public vari-
able U ∈ RU×12 are independent samples drawn from
Unif (−0.5, 0.5).
• The projection matrix of the i-th private variable, Gi =
G ∈ R3×12, where the entries of G are independent
samples drawn from Unif (−0.5, 0.5).
We do not impose the noise power constraint when retrieving
the maximum privacy under perfect utility. Each data point
shown in the figures is averaged over 100 independent exper-
iments.
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Fig. 1. The maximum privacy under perfect utility when no prior information
is available. Because the maximum privacy can be unbounded, it is truncated
when exceeding 100.
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Fig. 2. The maximum privacy under perfect utility when prior information
is available. The maximum privacy threshold is 74.1.
A. Maximum privacy under perfect utility
We vary S (the number of the agents) and U (the dimension
of the public parameter vector) to investigate the impact of
these parameters on the maximum privacy attainable under
perfect utility by solving (27). Recall that ǫmax1 = ∞ when
J0 = 0L while ǫmax1 is bounded when J0 ≻ 0L. From Fig. 1
with J0 = 0L, it can be seen that the maximum privacy
under perfect utility goes to infinity (ASUP is achieved) when
S = 1. By examining the necessary and sufficient conditions
for ASUP in Theorem 1, it is observed that a system with a
smaller number of agents S is more likely to fulfill the ASUP
conditions than a system with a larger S with all the other
settings remaining the same. In Fig. 2 with J0 ≻ 0L, none of
the maximum privacy obtained under perfect utility is close
to ǫmax1 (ASUP is not achieved). This can be elucidated from
Theorem 2, where every agent is required to satisfy certain
orthogonality conditions for ASUP to be achievable. Thus it is
unlikely to generate a random system model to achieve ASUP.
Furthermore, both Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate a descending
trend for the maximum privacy achievable as the number
of agents S increases or the length of the public parameter
vector u increases. To expound further on this, recall from
Theorems 1 and 2 that perfect utility is achieved if and only
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if
Tr
(
S∑
i=1
U [Ψ]:,SiΘi [Ψ]
⊺
:,Si
U⊺
)
= 0.
Therefore, to obtain u (IN ,Θ) = 0, a larger S or U is likely
to force more agents to have Θi = 0Ni . Thus a system
with a larger S or U has less degrees-of-freedom for privacy
perturbation when maintaining perfect utility compared to a
system with a smaller S or U .
B. Alternating optimization
By varying S and the privacy threshold ǫ1, Fig. 3 demon-
strates the utility and privacy tradeoff by using Algorithm 3
proposed in Section VI. It is observed that the utility decreases
as the privacy increases. Under the same setting, a larger
number of agents deteriorates the utility. This is because each
agent contains less measurements, thus giving less degrees-
of-freedom for the optimization and leading to smaller utility.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the optimal utility obtained
by the algorithm is close to perfect utility (u = 0) when the
privacy threshold ǫ1 is set to be equal to the maximum privacy
obtained under perfect utility. This implies that the algorithm
proposed in Section VI approximates the optimal solution well.
Fig. 4 shows the convergence of the algorithm.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Fig. 3. The privacy and utility tradeoff when S = 9, 12, 18, respectively,
obtained by using Algorithm 3. The corresponding maximum privacy under
perfect utility obtained by solving (27) is indicated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We defined utility and privacy using the CRLB and investi-
gated the utility-privacy tradeoff in a decentralized setting. We
showed that the privacy mechanism of linear compression can
be arbitrarily closely approximated by the privacy mechanism
using noise perturbation, and we showed how to translate
between these two mechanisms. Furthermore, we derived nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for achieving arbitrarily strong
utility-privacy tradeoff, and developed methods to minimize
privacy leakage while maintaining perfect utility under these
conditions. When arbitrarily strong utility-privacy tradeoff
is not achievable, we proposed an alternating optimization
approach to find the optimal privacy noise power to add.
Simulation results demonstrated the efficacy of our approach.
0 5 10 15 20
-1.75
-1.7
-1.65
-1.6
-1.55
-1.5
-1.45
-1.4
-1.35
Fig. 4. The utility at each iteration by using Algorithm 3, where the privacy
threshold is set to be 10.
In this paper, we have considered a linear system model
as well as linear privacy mechanisms. Analysis of nonlinear
models and privacy mechanisms is much more challenging
and is an interesting future research direction. In a nonlinear
model, one possible method is to apply data-driven approaches
like deep learning techniques to learn the privacy mechanisms
similar to [61] and [62], which however does not consider the
scenario with explicit public and private parameters.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (9), (12) AND (13)
If J0 = 0L, we have
P˜x(IN ,Θ)
=
(
H⊺ (R+Θ)
−1
H
)−1
=
(
H⊺
(
R−1 −R−1 (IN +ΘR−1)−1ΘR−1)H)−1
(31)
=
(
H⊺R−1H−H⊺R−1 (IN +ΘR−1)−1ΘR−1H)−1
= Px −PxH⊺R−1
(−IN −ΘR−1
+ΘR−1HPxH
⊺R−1
)−1
ΘR−1HPx
(32)
= Px +Ψ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺,
where Ψ = PxH⊺R−1 and Φ = R−1−R−1HPxH⊺R−1 ∈
SN , (31) follows from the binomial inverse theorem, and
(32) follows from the Woodbury matrix identity. Note that
Φ is a degenerate matrix since by letting the singular value
decomposition of H⊺R−1/2 = UΣV⊺, we have
Φ = R−1 −R−1HPxH⊺R−1
= R−1 −R−1/2R−1/2H(
H⊺R−1/2R−1/2H
)−1
H⊺R−1/2R−1/2
= R−1/2V diag(0L, IN−L)V
⊺R−1/2. (33)
12
On the other hand, if J0 ≻ 0L, we obtain
P˜x (IN ,Θ)
=
(
J0 +H
⊺ (R+Θ)
−1
H
)−1
= P0 −P0H⊺
(
Φ−1 +Θ
)−1
HP0 (34)
= P0 −P0H⊺
(
Φ−Φ (IN +ΘΦ)−1ΘΦ
)
HP0 (35)
= P0 −P0H⊺ΦH⊺P0 +P0H⊺Φ (IN +ΘΦ)−1ΘΦHP0
=
(
J0 +H
⊺R−1H
)−1
+P0H
⊺Φ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΦHP0
= Px +Ψ (IN +ΘΦ)
−1
ΘΨ⊺,
where P0 = J
−1
0 , Φ = (HP0H
⊺ +R)
−1, Ψ = P0H⊺Φ,
(34) follows from the Woodbury matrix identity, and (35) is a
consequence of the binomial inverse theorem.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since Tr
(
AS−1n A
⊺
) ≥ Tr(A (Sn +B)−1A⊺) ≥ 0, we
have
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
AS−1n A
⊺
)
= 0
=⇒ lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn +B)
−1
A⊺
)
= 0.
On the other hand, for µ a positive scalar greater than the
largest eigenvalue of B, we have
Tr
(
A (Sn +B)
−1
A⊺
)
≥ Tr
(
A (Sn + µIN )
−1
A⊺
)
≥ 0.
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn +B)
−1
A⊺
)
= 0
=⇒ lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn + µI)
−1
A⊺
)
= 0.
(36)
Let λi(n) > 0 be the i-th eigenvalue of Sn, associated with
a unit eigenvector vi (commuting matrices share the same
eigenspaces). Let αi = ‖Avi‖22. We obtain
0 = lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn + µIN )
−1
A⊺
)
= lim
n→∞
N∑
i=1
αi
λi(n) + µ
,
hence either αi = 0 or λi(n) → ∞ as n → ∞ for each
i = 1, . . . , N , which implies
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
AS−1n A
⊺
)
= lim
n→∞
N∑
i=1
αi
λi(n)
= 0.
Combining the above result with (36), we obtain
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
A (Sn +B)
−1
A⊺
)
= 0
=⇒ lim
n→∞
Tr
(
AS−1n A
⊺
)
= 0.
The proof is now complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let λi ≥ 0 be the i-th eigenvalue of S, associated with a
unit eigenvector vi. We first note that
Tr (ASA⊺) =
N∑
i=1
λi‖Avi‖22, (37)
lim
n→∞
Tr
(
B
(
nS+
1
n
IN
)−1
B⊺
)
= lim
n→∞
N∑
i=1
1
nλi − 1/n‖Bvi‖
2
2.
(38)
We first prove necessity. If both (37) and (38) are 0, Avi =
0 if λi 6= 0, and Bvi = 0 if λi = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , N .
This implies that vi is in the null space of eitherA, B or both.
Therefore, we have AQQ⊺B⊺ = 0, where Q = [v1, . . . ,vN ]
is a unitary matrix. Thus, AB⊺ = 0.
We next assume that AB⊺ = 0. Let {vi | i = 1, . . . , |B| }
be a basis of the row space of B and {vi | i = |B| +
1, . . . , |B| + |A| } be a basis of the row space of A, where
|A| = rank(A) and |B| = rank(B). Let λi > 0 if
i = 1, . . . , |B|, else λi = 0. Let S = Q diag
(
(λi)
N
i=1
)
Q⊺,
where Q = [v1, . . . ,vN ] is a unitary matrix. It can be easily
verified that such S satisfies the lemma conditions, and the
proof is complete.
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF (29) AND (30)
We show the steps to obtain the utility and privacy function
w.r.t. Θi described in Section VI. Partition Φi as
Φi =
[
[Φi]Ni,Ni [Φi]Ni,N\i
[Φi]N\i,Ni [Φi]N\i,N\i
]
,
where [Φi]Ni,Ni ∈ RNi×Ni , Ni = {1, . . . , Ni}, N\i = {Ni+
1, . . . , N}. We have
(
diag(Θi,Θ\i) +Φi
)−1
=
[
Θi + [Φi]Ni,Ni [Φi]Ni,N\i
[Φi]N\i,Ni Θ\i + [Φi]N\i,N\i
]−1
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
,
where
A11 =
(
Θi +Ω
)−1
,
A12 = −A11 [Φi]Ni,N\i T,
A21 = −T [Φi]N\i,Ni A11,
A22 = T+ [Φi]N\i,Ni A11 [Φi]Ni,N\i T,
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where Ω = [Φi]Ni,Ni − [Φi]Ni,N\i T [Φi]N\i,Ni and T =(
Θ\i + [Φi]N\i,N\i
)−1
. Therefore, we have
Px
(
Θi
)
= Px +
[
[Ψi]:,Ni , [Ψi]:,N\i
]
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
[Ψi]:,Ni , [Ψi]:,N\i
]⊺
= Px + [Ψi]:,N1 A11 [Ψi]
⊺
:,Ni
+ [Ψi]:,N\iA21 [Ψi]
⊺
:,Ni
+ [Ψi]:,N1 A12 [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
+ [Ψi]:,N\i A22 [Ψi]
⊺
:,N\i
.
Therefore, the utility and j-th privacy function can be written
as
u
(
Θi
)
= −Tr
(
Γu
(
Θi +Ω
)−1)
/Tr (UPxU
⊺)−∆u,
pj
(
Θi
)
= Tr
(
Γpj
(
Θi +Ω
)−1)
/Tr
(
GjPxG
⊺
j
)
+∆pj ,
where ∆pj ,∆u,Γu,Γp are defined in Section VI.
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